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SYSTEMIC RISK, MONETARY AND MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY
I analyze the relationship between credit cycles and systemic risk, and their interaction 
with monetary and macroprudential policy. In particular, I answer the following questions: 
Are credit cycles one of the main determinants of the likelihood and severity of systemic 
financial crises? Do macroprudential and monetary policy affect credit supply cycles? The 
evidence summarized in this article shows that credit cycles are crucial for systemic risk 
– they are the main ex-ante correlate of financial crises, and conditioned on crises, they are 
associated to worse real effects – and, importantly, monetary and macroprudential policy 
are key determinants of credit supply cycles and excessive risk-taking.
In 2008 the economies of the United States and Western Europe, including Spain, were 
overwhelmed by a banking crisis, which was followed by a severe economic recession, with 
important costs in terms of aggregate output and employment.1 These phenomena are not 
unique: Banking crises are recurrent phenomena, triggering deep and long-lasting recessions 
[see Kindelberger (1978) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) for historical evidence]. The main 
channel by which banks’ balance-sheet weaknesses affect the real economy is via a reduction 
of the supply of credit, a credit crunch, and also through some compositional changes of credit 
supply as a significant reduction of appetite for risk. Importantly, banking crises are not random 
events that come from exogenous risks, but come after periods of very strong private credit 
growth [Schularick and Taylor (2012)]. Therefore, for systemic risk, it is crucial to understand 
the determinants and implications of credit in good and bad times – the so-called credit cycles. 
Monetary policy, moreover, has been crucial in dealing with the costs associated to the 
financial crisis after September 2008, both in terms of interest rate policy and in terms of 
central bank liquidity operations as Long-term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) in the euro 
area or quantitative easing in US, but also some commentators have argued that low 
monetary policy rates in the euro area and US during the 2000 expansion were crucial to 
trigger a credit boom and asset price bubble. 
There is more agreement among academics and policymakers that financial regulation 
needs to acquire a macroprudential dimension that ultimately aims to lessen the potentially 
damaging negative externalities from the financial to the macroeconomic real sector, as for 
example in a credit crunch. Importantly, as systemic risk is endogenous with a build-up of 
financial imbalances over time (for example, credit supply booms in correlated risk exposures 
as in an asset price bubble, for instance in real estate, financed with foreign short-term 
wholesale finance), an important mission for macroprudential policy is to curb ex-ante 
(pre-crisis) excessive risk-taking by banks, not just deal with ex-post crisis management. 
Countercyclical macroprudential policy tools could be used to address these cyclical 
vulnerabilities in systemic risk, by slowing excessive credit growth in good times and 
especially by boosting it in bad times. Under the new international regulatory framework 
for banks – Basel III – regulators agreed to vary minimum capital requirements over the 
cycle, by instituting countercyclical bank capital buffers (i.e., procyclical capital 
requirements). As part of the cyclical mandate of macroprudential policy the objective is 
 1  Introduction
1  This article is mainly based on my book with Xavier Freixas and Luc Laeven on systemic risk [Freixas, Laeven 
and Peydró (forthcoming)], and on my work with Gabriel Jiménez, Steven Ongena and Jesús Saurina [Jiménez 
et al. (2012), Jiménez et al. (forthcoming), Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2013)]. I thank the Editors for 
helpful comments and suggestions. Email: jose.peydro@gmail.com. 
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that in booms capital requirements will increase while in busts requirements will decrease, 
thus increasing the buffers of capital that banks have when a crisis hits.
A key explanation of credit supply cycles is based on an agency view, where this view 
highlights agency problems at the core of the build-up of systemic risk that have to do with 
the difficulties of aligning the incentives between the principal (for instance, bank 
bondholders or the taxpayers) and the agent (bank managers or shareholders). This is the 
channel we highlight in this article, but another important view is the preference channel, 
in particular behavioral biases as for example neglecting tail risk in good times or 
overoptimistic behavior by market participants [see Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2012); 
Freixas, Laeven and Peydró (forthcoming)]. Depending on which is the correct view of the 
determinants of excessive risk-taking (preferences vs. agency channel) in financial 
intermediaries, optimal prudential policy will be different. For example, higher capital 
requirements would be positive by increasing buffers in a crisis under both channels, but 
under the agency channel they may also reduce ex-ante excessive risk-taking by making 
the financial intermediaries have more own skin in the game.
This article analyzes the relationship between credit cycles and systemic risk, and the 
interaction with monetary and macroprudential policy, where systemic risk is defined, 
based on Freixas, Laeven and Peydró (forthcoming), as “the risk of threats to financial 
stability that impair the functioning of the financial system as a whole with significant 
adverse effects on the broader economy.” In particular, I analyze the following questions: 
Are credit cycles one of the main determinants of the likelihood and severity of systemic 
financial crises? Do macroprudential and monetary policy affect credit cycles? Our 
emphasis is associated to credit supply cycles, i.e. the ones not associated to borrowers’ 
stronger economic fundamentals.
In the rest of this article, first, I define credit supply cycles and excessive risk-taking in 
credit, and its relationship with systemic risk and financial crises. Second, I analyze the 
impact of monetary policy on credit supply based on evidence from Spain. Third, I analyze 
macroprudential policy, in particular the impact on credit supply of countercyclical capital 
requirements stemming from the Spanish experience with dynamic provisioning. Finally, I 
offer some concluding remarks. 
The cycles in credit growth consist of periods during which the economy is performing well 
and credit growth is robust (on average 7%) and periods when the economy is in recession 
or crisis and credit contracts [on average -2% for a sample of 14 major developed countries 
over the last 140 years, see Schularick and Taylor (2012) and their following papers with 
Oscar Jordà)].2 Credit cycles stem from either: 1) Non-financial borrowers’ agency frictions 
and investment opportunities (credit demand) as in, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989), 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Lorenzoni (2008), and Jeanne and Korinek (2010), where better 
investment opportunities or better firms’ and households’ collateral and net worth imply 
higher credit, or 2) banks’ agency frictions (credit supply) as in, for example, Rajan (1994), 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Diamond and Rajan (2006), Allen and Gale (2007), and Adrian 
and Shin (2011), where changes in bank capital, liquidity and competition allow changes 
in credit supply. Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) shows the change in lending conditions 
associated to credit supply and demand factors for Europe and US.
2  Credit booms, 
systemic risk 
and financial crises
2  Aggregate granted credit is not as forward looking as change in the supply of committed credit as it is also 
affected by credit demand, notably drawn down of existing credit lines; instead, change in lending standards 
from lending surveys from central banks is more forward looking [see Maddaloni and Peydró (2011)].
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The main explanation of credit supply cycles in this article is based on an agency view. The 
agency view highlights agency problems at the core of the build-up of systemic risk that 
have to do with the difficulties of aligning the incentives between the principal (for instance, 
bank bondholders or the taxpayers) and the agent (bank managers or shareholders). First, 
the basic agency problem stems from the fact that most financial intermediaries have 
limited liability (their losses are limited) and invest money on behalf of others (the final 
investors). Moreover, they are highly leveraged, notably banks that are funded almost 
entirely with debt, notably short-term (some banks are funded with 50 units of debt over 1 
of equity and many have leverage ratios higher than 30 to 1). These frictions create strong 
incentives for excessive risk-taking as there is little skin in the game for bank shareholders 
but high potential upside profits. Second, excessive risk-taking notably increases when 
there are explicit and implicit guarantees and subsidies from the government (taxpayers) in 
case of negative ex-post aggregate risks (such as a financial crisis). This increases ex-ante 
agency problems of financial intermediaries as financial gains are privatized, but losses are 
in great part socialized. 
For example, the excessive credit boom and lending standards deterioration in the USA 
and Spain real estate market before the recent crisis has partly been blamed on several 
factors: i) the financial innovation that fostered in the USA the development of an 
unregulated shadow banking system to arbitrate (evade) bank capital regulation; ii) in the 
USA and Spain strong funding liquidity through securitization sold to foreign financial 
intermediaries due to financial globalization [in Spain more covered bonds than Asset-
backed Security (ABS)]; iii) deficient corporate governance and lack of market discipline; 
iv) very loose monetary policy [in Spain real interest rates were negative as Germany was 
having low Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth and the European Central Bank (ECB) 
had therefore too low monetary rates for countries like Spain and Ireland]; and v) prudential 
regulation and supervision focused too much on micro, rather on the whole financial 
system and the real economy – i.e., macroprudential. Moreover, the potential government 
bailouts imply a lack of market disciplining by bank creditors by not imposing losses on 
these debt-holders (as in the case of Ireland), which creates ex-ante moral hazard and 
appetite for excessive risk.3 
The theory suggests that financial intermediaries might take excessive ex-ante risks, 
increasing collectively the systemic risk in the financial system. But what are the specific 
factors and decisions that will cause excessive risks? The main channel is excessive credit 
and leverage. In fact, these variables show the strongest ex-ante correlate with the 
incidence of financial crises as shown in the empirical literature analyzing large historical 
and cross-country episodes of systemic financial crises. Private credit (debt and leverage) 
acceleration notably increases the likelihood of financial crises, and conditional on a crisis 
occurring, it increases its systemic nature and the negative effects on the real economy 
associated with the crisis. 
The recent financial crisis has come after a period of significant credit expansion. In order 
to understand systemic risk, we need to know whether this fact is unique to this crisis or 
shared among many financial crises. However, financial crises are not frequent events, and 
hence in order to study the determinants of such crises it is necessary to use long time 
series for several countries. Schularick and Taylor (2012) analyze the relationship of financial 
crises with aggregate bank credit growth. They build a 140-year panel data set for fourteen 
developed countries and construct bank credit and total asset series. Before the Great 
3  See Pagano (2012), Stein (2013) and Freixas et al. (forthcoming).
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Depression, money and credit aggregates have a stable relationship with GDP, increasing 
before the crisis and decreasing afterwards. After the 1940s, credit itself decoupled from 
broad money by increasing leverage and funding via nonmonetary liabilities of banks. 
Schularick and Taylor (2012) also analyze the likelihood and severity of financial crises and 
show that changes in bank loans are a strong predictor of financial crises. Furthermore, broad 
money aggregates do not have the same predictive power, particularly in the post-1940 
period. Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2011) study the role of credit in the whole business 
cycle, not only around financial crises. They find that financial-crisis recessions are more 
costly than normal recessions in terms of lost output, and for both types of recessions, 
they show that the financial imbalances built up in the period preceding the crisis (bank 
credit) are important drivers of the strong negative real effects to the broad economy 
during the crisis. Specifically, not only does ex-ante credit growth affect the likelihood of a 
financial crisis, but conditional on a crisis, the real effects are worse when the crisis is 
preceded by a credit boom. Therefore, this historical analysis shows that ex-ante financial 
imbalances are a first-order determinant of systemic risk.
Their findings suggest that the prior evolution of credit shapes the business cycle. This has 
important implications for macroeconomic models: if credit were to just follow economic 
fundamentals and had little impact on the business cycle, then models omitting the 
frictions in the financial sector might be sufficient. Nevertheless, these findings suggest 
that more sophisticated macro models featuring financial intermediation are needed.
Using the same dataset, Jordà et al. (2011) analyze whether ex-ante external imbalances 
increase the risk of financial crises. In other words, are external imbalances associated 
with higher costs in the recession, or are credit booms the only important variable? Their 
overall finding is that ex-ante credit growth emerges as the single best predictor of financial 
instability; however, the correlation between current account imbalances and credit booms 
has increased significantly in the recent decades, which indicates that financial globalization 
plays a role as well. In a globalized economy, with free capital mobility, credit cycles and 
foreign capital flows have the potential to reinforce each other more strongly than otherwise 
[on this argument, see also Shin (2012)]. Clearly, a strong and sustained credit boom 
cannot typically be financed with an increase of domestic deposits and wealth (especially 
if not driven by very strong fundamentals); therefore, foreign liquidity, or liquidity stemming 
from expansive monetary policy or financial innovation (e.g., securitization), need to be 
present and interact with credit cycles.4 Finally, Jordà et al. (2013) show that the main 
determinant is ex-ante private (bank) credit rather than public debt.
The historical evidence clearly suggests that high rates of credit growth coupled with 
widening imbalances pose financial stability risks that policy makers and academics should 
not ignore. Moreover, in the recent crisis, the credit booms and large current account 
imbalances in many countries, low levels of short-term (monetary) and long-term rates, and 
increasing recourse to securitization, all seem to confirm that credit growth and capital 
inflows and other forms of liquidity nowadays interact in a stronger way. Maddaloni and 
Peydró (2011) analyze these issues for the recent crisis. Using the survey of lending 
conditions and standards for the euro area countries and the USA that the national central 
banks and regional Feds request from banks, they analyze the determinants of lending 
conditions and standards for the financial crisis that started in 2007. They find that countries 
with worse economic performance during the crisis are those with ex-ante softer lending 
4  Of course, some credit booms can be financed by domestic savings as we are seeing recently with China.
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conditions. They also find that lower monetary policy rates imply softer lending conditions 
and standards. However, after controlling for key factors (such as country fixed effects and 
business cycle conditions), current account deficits or lower long-term interest rates do not 
correlate with softer lending conditions. Finally, Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) find that lending 
standards are pro-cyclical (in the upside of the business cycle, lending conditions are softer 
and banks take on higher risk), a result consistent with Jiménez and Saurina (2006) for Spain.
Credit booms are therefore a crucial ex-ante correlate of financial crises. Yet, all of these 
empirical analyses condition on the occurrence of a crisis and ask what its determinants are. 
But, do all credit booms end up in a crisis? The International Monetary Found [IMF (2012)] 
analyzes credit booms for 170 countries over the last 40 years of data. They show three 
important results: credit booms have become more frequent after the 1980s (a period of 
significant financial deregulation); most booms happen in relatively underdeveloped financial 
systems; and only one in three credit booms end up in a financial crisis.
Credit booms, however, may also result from (and promote) sound economic fundamentals 
(demand-driven credit) and, therefore, could be benign for systemic risk.5 For example, since 
1970s across a broad range of countries, research has shown that two thirds of credit booms 
did not end up in a financial crisis [IMF (2012)]. Therefore, a key question that we analyze is 
what are the determinants of the bad credit booms, in particular the ones associated with 
credit supply (i.e., based on pervasive bank incentives). Credit supply booms that are negative 
for systemic risk generally stem from correlated risk-exposures by the financial intermediaries 
that end up developing asset-price bubbles in real estate or in other asset classes. This 
herding by financial intermediaries may also make small and medium banks become systemic 
since the government may ex-post bailout them, as otherwise there would be too many to fail. 
Deficient corporate governance where bank managers maximize only bank shareholder value 
(a small part of the bank total assets) with executive compensation based on relative 
performance with stock options and lack of claw-back options or based on some political 
objectives as in the Spanish cajas may also encourage this type of excessive risk-taking. 
We have seen that credit booms appear to precede financial crises, but only one third end 
up in a crisis, thus an important part of credit booms are driven by strong economic 
fundamentals and do not pose a risk for systemic risk. What are the determinants of credit 
supply booms and other financial imbalances? How can we measure bad credit booms? In the 
rest of the article, I summarize evidence based on loan level data, including loan applications, 
where we can isolate credit supply changes associated to low bank capital ratios.
To finance a credit supply boom, there is a need for bank liquidity. Liquidity can come from 
expansive monetary policy, from financial innovation (for example, securitization) or from 
foreigners (for example, through financial globalization).6 In this section we analyze the different 
sources and the implications for financial imbalances stemming from credit supply cycles.
3  Monetary policy 
and credit supply
5  This does not mean that all demand-driven credit booms result from fundamentals. For example, they can be 
driven by collateral values. Although there is an extensive literature focusing on frictions on credit demand, it is 
not the focus of this article.
6  For financial globalization, see Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydró (2010 and 2013). For securitization, see 
Jiménez, Mian, Peydró and Saurina (2013) and Maddaloni and Peydró (2011 and 2013). In Jiménez, Mian et al. 
(2013), we focus on the effects of securitization on lending from Spanish banks, where securitization was done 
using real-estate loans. We find very interesting results that shed light on how credit booms are characterized. 
Securitization did not affect firms with already strong access to the banking sector. However, it was the extensi-
ve margin (i.e., new borrowers) the ones that were more affected for credit volume supplied. Banks engaged in 
real estate activities were able, through securitization, to expand their credit to new borrowers, which are usually 
riskier and, in fact, defaulted more. In Maddaloni and Peydró (2011 and 2013) we find that securitization also 
implied a softening of lending conditions and standards in Europe and the USA.
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A key question in macroeconomics and finance is whether monetary policy, and in general 
economic conditions, affects bank loan supply [Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke 
and Gertler (1995)] and whether credit availability depend on bank balance-sheet strength 
[Bernanke (2007)]. That is, do agency costs of borrowing between banks and their 
financiers – proxied by bank capital and liquidity to total assets ratios as in Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997) and Diamond and Rajan (2011), for example – make lending significantly more 
problematic during periods of higher monetary policy rates or lower economic activity? 
Put differently, is a bank lending channel operational, and, if so, how potent is it?
To convincingly answer these questions two major identification challenges need to be 
addressed. First, the supply of credit needs to be disentangled from its demand. Tighter 
monetary conditions and lower economic growth may reduce both loan supply and 
demand. Supply may contract because – as already indicated – agency costs of banks 
may increase, but demand may contemporaneously fall because firm net worth and 
expectations for investment are reduced, and the cost of financing is higher. In addition, 
firms affected more by monetary and economic conditions may borrow more from affected 
banks [Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)]. All this implies that any analysis based only on macro 
data [Bernanke and Blinder (1992)] or bank-level data [Kashyap and Stein (2000)] may suffer 
from an omitted-variables problem. Second, if country business cycle conditions completely 
determine short-term interest rate changes, which may be the case in many countries 
[e.g., through a Taylor (1993) – rule], separating the effects of monetary conditions from 
those of economic activity is problematic.
Our main contribution to the literature in Jiménez et al. (2012) consists in taking crucial 
steps in addressing both identification challenges. In particular, we analyze the effects of 
monetary conditions and economic activity on the granting of loans with individual loan 
application records depending on the strength of bank balance sheets measured by bank 
capital and liquidity ratios, controlling for time-varying observed and unobserved firm 
heterogeneity with firm-month fixed effects (i.e., there is a dummy for every firm-year: month 
combination). The data are from Spain, a country where most firms are bank dependent 
and where monetary policy has been fairly exogenous.
Unique features of the Credit Register of Spain (CIR), which is collected by the Banco de 
Españ a acting in its capacity as bank supervisor, help us to attain identification. Since 
2012 the CIR recorded all monthly information requests lodged by banks on borrowers. 
Because banks monthly receive information on all outstanding loans and defaults of their 
current borrowers from CIR, they lodge information requests only following loan 
applications from firms that are currently not borrowing from them. Because the CIR 
database also contains detailed monthly information on all, new and outstanding, loans 
(over 6,000 euros) to non-financial firms granted by all credit institutions operating in Spain 
since 1984, we can match the set of corresponding loan applications with the loan that is 
actually granted by a bank. The loans granted to noncurrent borrowers surely do not 
involve simply the renewal or evergreening of outstanding loans. Moreover, Banco de 
Españ a has complete monthly bank balance-sheet information also collected in its role as 
bank supervisor and has access to key firm characteristics, including identity. We analyze 
2,335,321 loan applications in total and in Jiménez et al. (2013 and 2014) we also analyze 
all credit granted, in addition to loan applications.
The unique features of the CIR allow us to address the two major identification challenges. 
First, to separate bank loan supply from demand we study loan applications and exploit 
theoretically motivated interactions between economic and monetary conditions on the 
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one hand and bank balance-sheet strength variables on the other [Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1996), Kashyap and Stein (2000)]. The definition of the bank capital and liquidity 
to total assets ratios we employ closely follows the theoretical literature that attributes a 
prominent role to net worth in reducing the agency costs of borrowing.
To achieve identification we further focus on the set of loan applications made in the same 
month by the same borrower or for the same loan to different banks of varying balance-
sheet strengths (by including in the specifications firm-month or alternatively loan fixed 
effects). Within this set of loan applications, for which the (observed and unobserved) 
quality of potential borrowers is constant as in the credit crunch definition by Bernanke 
and Lown (1991), we study how monetary and economic conditions affect the granting of 
loans depending on bank capital and liquidity. Moreover, we analyze whether firms that get 
rejected in their initial loan application can undo the resultant reduction in credit availability 
by successfully applying to other banks.
Second, to distinguish between the impact of monetary and economic conditions, we rely on 
the observation that monetary policy in Spain has been fairly exogenous during the sample 
period. Spain accounts for around 10 percent of the euro area output and as a peripheral 
country its business cycle did not converge with those of the core countries of the euro area.
Our study yields the following robust results: higher short-term interest rates or lower GDP 
growth reduce the probability that a loan application is granted. The negative effect of 
higher short-term interest rate on loan granting is statistically stronger for banks with low 
capital or liquidity, whereas the negative effect of lower GDP growth is statistically stronger 
for banks with low capital. The estimated effects are also economically relevant. A 100-basis 
point increase (decrease) in the interest rate (GDP growth) reduces loan granting by weak 
banks by 11 (5) percent more than by strong banks (i.e., a weak bank is in the tenth percentile 
in both bank capital and liquidity; a strong bank is in the ninetieth percentile).
All findings are robust to multiple controls, in particular to the inclusion of firm- month or 
loan fixed effects, implying that within the set of applications made in the same month or 
for the same loan by the same firm to different banks, banks with weaker balance sheets 
grant fewer loan applications when short-term interest rate are higher or when GDP growth 
is lower. This was the first evidence that clearly identifies that, under tighter monetary or 
economic conditions, low bank capital or liquidity begets a credit crunch. Finally, we find 
that- firms that get rejected in their initial loan application cannot undo the resultant 
reduction in credit availability by applying to other banks, especially in periods of tighter 
monetary and economic conditions. 
But not only too low short term rates can expand credit supply, but also can increase the 
risk-taking incentives of banks. This is what Adrian and Shin call “the risk-taking channel 
of monetary policy” in the last Handbook of Monetary Economics [Adrian and Shin (2011)].7 
In Jiménez et al. (2014) we study this channel. Since the severe financial crisis of 2007-
2009, the question on whether low monetary policy rates cause excessive risk-taking by 
financial intermediaries has been at the center of an intense academic and policy debate. 
From the start of the crisis in the summer of 2007, market commentators were swift to 
argue that during the long period of very low interest rates, stretching from 2002 to 2005, 
banks had softened their lending standards and taken on excessive risk, whereas others 
argued that low long-term rates and other factors were the culprit. But, at the same time, 
3.1  MONETARY POLICY 
AND RISK-TAKING
7  See also Borio and Zhu (2012).
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market participants continuously clamored for central banks to reduce the monetary policy 
rate to alleviate their financial predicament. 
Recent theoretical work suggests that expansive monetary policy through the increase in 
funding provided by households and other agents to banks may cause an increase in risk-
shifting in lending, as banks face strong moral hazard problems – especially banks with 
lower capital amounts at stake, who do not fully internalize loan defaults. A low short-term 
interest rate makes riskless assets less attractive and may lead to a search for yield by 
financial intermediaries with short-term time horizons. Acute agency problems combined 
with a strong reliance on short-term funding may thus lead the short-term (monetary) 
interest rate – more than the long-term interest rate – to spur bank risk-taking.
Monetary policy rate changes may affect the credit quality of the pool of borrowers through 
the interest rate channel and the firm balance-sheet channel of monetary policy by 
changing firm investment opportunities, net worth, and collateral [Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995)]. Moreover, monetary policy, by affecting bank liquidity, may affect the volume of 
credit supplied through the bank balance-sheet/lending channel of monetary policy 
[Kashyap and Stein (2000)]. Therefore, the decisive identification challenge we address is 
to disentangle the impact of changes in the monetary policy rate on the composition of the 
supply of credit from changes in the volume of the supply and changes in the quality and 
volume of demand, while accounting for the impact of other aggregate variables, including 
long-term interest rates. Importantly, while the bank balance-sheet channel yields testable 
predictions at the bank level, and the firm balance sheet and interest rate channels at the 
firm level, the bank risk-taking channel involves compositional changes in the supply of 
credit at the bank-firm level.
The very detailed data on loan applications and outcomes in Spain has allowed us to identify 
the effect of monetary policy on banks’ risk-taking behavior. We separate the changes in the 
composition of the supply of credit from the concurrent changes in the volume of supply and 
quality and volume of demand. We employ a two-stage model that analyzes the granting of 
loan applications in the first stage and loan outcomes for the applications granted in the 
second stage, and that controls for both observed and unobserved, time-varying, firm and 
bank heterogeneity through time “firm and time” bank fixed effects. 
We find robust evidence that a lower overnight rate induces lowly capitalized banks to 
grant more loan applications to ex ante risky firms (than highly capitalized banks), where 
firm risk is measured with the presence of a bad credit history with nonperforming loans. 
When granting applications to these firms (when the overnight rate is lower), lowly 
capitalized banks further commit more credit and require less collateral, yet their granted 
loan applications overall face a higher future likelihood of default.
All findings are statistically significant and economically relevant. A decrease of 1 percentage 
point in the overnight rate, for example, increases the probability that a loan will be granted 
by a lowly versus a highly capitalized bank (with a difference of 1 standard deviation 
between them) to a firm with a bad credit history by 8 percent and the resultant committed 
amount of credit increases by 18 percent, while the future likelihood of loan default of 
these loans increases by 5 percent and the required collateral decreases by 7 percent. A 
lower long-term interest rate and other key aggregate bank and macro variables, such as 
more securitization or higher current account deficits, have no such effects. Importantly, 
when the overnight rate is lower, virtually all banks grant more credit to firms with higher 
risk (by around 19 percent for the average bank).
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In sum, our estimates suggest that a lower monetary policy rate spurs bank risk-taking and 
hence that monetary policy affects the composition of the supply of credit beyond the well 
documented effects of both the bank and firm balance-sheet channels. Consistent with 
“excessive” risk-taking are our findings that especially banks with less capital “in the 
game”, that is, those afflicted more by agency problems, grant more loan applications and 
resultant credit to ex ante risky firms, that these banks require less collateral requirements 
from these firms, and that these banks face more default on their granted loans in the 
future – all bank actions that accord with risk-shifting.8 
The 2008-09 global economic and financial crises have changed the consensus on how to 
conduct prudential regulation. Before it was “micro-oriented”, focused on ensuring the 
solvency of individual financial institutions and paying little attention to the financial system 
as a whole. The consensus was that by ensuring adequate capital ratios at the individual 
level, the whole system would be solvent. However, after a negative shock, banks may try 
to increase their capital buffers by decreasing their lending, which can create a credit 
crunch and fire sales that can in fact worsen the initial shock. In other words, by trying to 
increase their individual solvency, banks may be imposing negative externalities on the 
rest of the system, thus decreasing the overall financial stability. Micro-prudential policy, 
hence, is not well equipped to deal with systemic risk. Financial regulation is now becoming 
more macro-focused, focusing on the risks of the financial system as a whole, both the 
build-up of financial imbalances, and the externalities within the financial sector and from 
the financial to the real sector. In other words, going forward prudential regulation should 
also focus on systemic risk (see Freixas et al., forthcoming). 
Examples of this type of macroprudential policy approach are the so-called countercyclical 
capital buffers. This new policy requires banks to hold additional capital when aggregate 
credit is expanding fast. The intention is twofold: by requiring this additional capital, banks 
will be more capitalized when a recession comes, thus alleviating the credit crunch 
problem. On top of that, the additional capital may cool down the credit expansion, thus 
lowering both the probability of a crisis and the cost of it if it occurs. Dynamic provisioning, 
a regulation introduced in 2000 in Spain, is also an example of a macroprudential policy on 
countercyclical capital requirements.
In Jiménez, Ongena et al. (2013) we analyze the impact of countercyclical capital buffers 
held by banks on the supply of credit to firms and their subsequent performance, exploiting 
the Spanish dynamic provisioning. Spain introduced dynamic provisioning unrelated to 
specific bank loan losses in 2000 and modified its formula parameters in 2005 and 2008. In 
each case, individual banks were impacted differently. The resultant bank-specific shocks 
to capital buffers, coupled with comprehensive bank-, firm-, loan-, and loan application-
level data, allow us to identify its impact on the supply of credit and on real activity. 
Our estimates show that countercyclical dynamic provisioning smoothes cycles in the 
supply of credit and in bad times upholds firm financing and performance. The estimates 
are also economically relevant. Firms borrowing from banks with a 1 percentage point 
higher dynamic provision funds (over loans) prior to the crisis get a 6 percentage points higher 
credit growth, a 2.5 percentage points higher asset growth, a 2.7 percentage points 
higher employment growth, and a 1 percentage point higher likelihood of survival.
4  Macroprudential policy 
and credit supply
8  On-going empirical work documents the robust existence and potency of a bank risk-taking channel of monetary 
policy across many countries and time periods, for example, for the United States, Austria, Portugal, Colombia, 
Bolivia, Czech Republic and Sweden.
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Historical evidence shows that either looking at financial crises in the past or looking at the 
recent global crisis, high ex-ante credit booms is the main ex-ante correlate in determining 
the likelihood of systemic financial crises, and conditioning on the crisis, high ex-ante 
credit booms increase the severity of the financial crisis, with stronger negative real effects. 
Important channels during the crises are credit crunches and during the ex-ante pre-crisis 
are financial imbalances caused by excessive credit growth. 
As empirical evidence by several papers co-authored with Gabriel Jiménez, Steven 
Ongena and Jesús Saurina show, monetary and macroprudential policies affect credit 
supply cycles and bank risk-taking. Moreover, the effects differ in good and bad times, 
with very strong effects in crisis times for an increase of credit supply with expansive 
monetary policy and countercyclical capital buffers. Both policymakers and academics 
should pay more attention to credit cycles, notably supply driven, and their relation with 
monetary and macroprudential policies. 
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